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This study researches whether there has been abnormal stock market behaviour in 
Brazil as a consequence of election news (observed via opinion polls), regarding the last 
Brazilian presidential election, held in October 2014. Via applying event study 
methodology, the research on the Ibovespa and Petrobras suggests that events in which 
Rousseff was gaining in share have been subject to negative abnormal returns, and 
events where Rousseff was loosing in share have led to positive abnormal returns. 
Moreover, volatility has been significantly elevated during the election period and 
volume has been found to have slightly increased. 
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“The Brazilian unit of Banco Santander has fired an analyst and other employees 
involved in the publication of a client note critical of President Dilma Rousseff's 
economic policies” (Jelmayer & Magalhaes, 2014). 
 This statement clearly highlights that there is a controversial point of 
intersection between the so-called political world and the financial sector. Within a 
newspaper article of the Wall Street Journal Jelmayer and Magalhaes (2014) state that 
the report in question, responsible for the expulsion of several employees, was 
concerned with a warning of wealthy clients to prepare for the outcome of the (back 
then) ‘upcoming’ Brazilian elections. It was stated that when the incumbent president 
Rousseff was re-elected the overall stock market might suffer. This notion is based on 
the fact that “Brazil's stock market has rallied repeatedly in recent weeks upon the 
release of a respected public-opinion poll showing Ms. Rousseff's lead slipping” 
(Jelmayer & Magalhaes, 2014: 1). The incident received public and political attention, 
cumulating in former President Lula da Silva’s rather harsh statement: “This girl 
doesn’t understand squat about Brazil […] they should fire her and give me her Bonus. 
There’s no place in the world where Santander earns more money than in Brazil” 
(Margolis, 2014: 1)1. Santander apologised publicly to Rousseff and laid of the analysts 
in question; roughly one year later one of the fired analysts, Sinara Polycarpo, judicially 
obtained 450 R$2 as an indemnity for moral damages (Globo G1, 2015). These events 
clearly highlight that the interplay between political and financial systems is 
                                                
1 The statement above is a translation of Lula’s words, which published within a Bloomberg View article. 
The Brazilian news network Globo cited Lula’s comment as follows: “manter uma mulher dessa num 
cargo de chefia, sinceramente …Pode mandar embora. E dá o bônus dela pra mim” (G1 Globo, 2014: 1). 
However, the Brazilian financial news website InfoMoney differently quoted Lula’s statement: “essa 
moça não entende p***a nenhuma de Brasil e de governo Dilma” (Salomão, 2014: 1).  
2 Equating 11,297 US$ or 10,395 € (as of December 19, 2015) 
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contentious, and to gain an academic perspective on the politically charged and 
opinionated issue, this paper aims for researching whether pre-election trends are 
impacting overall stock market behaviour. In this sense, the paper is concerned with 
answering the subsequent research question: 
 
Have election trends, as observed via opinion polls, been impacting Brazilian market 
behaviour, in regard to IBovespa’s returns, volatility and volume, and the returns of 
governmentally related stocks? 
 
Within the following, it is investigated whether there is an impact existent, the null 
hypotheses of no impact (zero abnormal returns, abnormal volume and abnormal 
volatility) are tested. Furthermore, the two governmentally related stocks of Petrobras 
and Vale are tested for abnormal returns in relation to election news. 
 In hindsight it is observable that since the final presidential election (October 26, 
2014) the Ibovespa has been following a downward trend. See Figure 1 below3: 
 
Figure 1: Index Level Ibovespa – September 2014 until December 2015 
                                                
3 The Post-Event Window in the graph above highlights the period of September-October 2015, exactly 
one year after the election period in 2014, to compare the overall Index decay that has been happening 
within the passage of the year. 
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In order to additionally validate the significance, the study introduces a robustness test 
of running the very same methodology that has been used for testing contingent 
abnormal returns within the Brazilian pre-election period on the Argentinian stock index 
MERVAL.  
 The following section is concerned with providing relevant background 
information regarding the theoretical frameworks of the subject; further it resumes 
pertinent background information and outlines the analytical framework and 
methodology of the study. Second, the analysis section deals with researching the actual 
impacts of market returns, volatility, volume, and governmentally related stocks in 
regard to election trends in Brazil. Finally, a concluding part is concerned with making 
sense of the findings and placing them in the wider context of political environment as 
well as running the ‘placebo’ study of Argentina’s stock index.  
 
 
2 Analytical Framework 
2.1 Theoretical Notions and Literature Review 
There are several theoretical notions and concepts to be found within academic 
literature, drawing upon different kinds of interplays between politics and financial 
concerns: 
 From a general perspective, there has been a mutual agreement within academia, 
that pre-election periods may result in abnormal, mostly positive returns. This is 
basically following the same logic of a company’s stock price going up when the firm is 
facing major changes, such as a take-over or a merger, since this action is ideally 
promising change for the better; restructuring an entity that is obviously not working at 
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highest possible productivity, otherwise a merger/ acquisition was not necessary or 
possible. Based on this idea, upcoming elections in a democratic setting bring along the 
spirit of change, that is hopefully for the better as well, or at least for matching the 
people’s ideas with governmental composition. 
 In this regard, the results of Allvine and O’Neill (1980) show that there is a 
positive correlation between presidential election cycles and stock market behaviour. 
Their study is concerned with the United State’s election cycle; they found an upward 
trend over a two-year period prior to presidential elections. This was confirmed by 
studies of Johnson et al. (1999), who found that within the second part of the presidency 
stock returns were significantly higher, implying that that stock market trends are 
somehow following election cycles. Panzalis et al. (2000) confirmed these results on an 
international level. They also found positive abnormal returns when election week has 
been approaching. 
 There are several differing theories that are dealing with explaining the 
relationship of a country’s stock market behaviour and its correlation to political news 
in general, as well as to elections: In that sense, the model of the political business cycle 
was developed by Nordhaus in 1975; which is explaining the manipulating influence of 
political parties in order to attempt wining re-elections. Further, Hibbs (1977) proposed 
the so-called partisan theory which draws on the differing stresses of labour versus 
business oriented parties. 
 Within the framework of behavioural finance the notion of voters’ sentiments 
plays a crucial role, since it may influence market behaviour in terms of investors’ 
dealing with uncertainty (see Statmann, 1999). Here it becomes, necessary to briefly 
draw upon the market’s absorption of news in general: What is known in academia as 
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the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), may simplified be described as a market 
environment in which (stock-) prices fully reflect all available information. Fama 
(1965) was the first to mention the concept and in 1970 Fama classified three distinct 
forms of market efficiency, a weak, a semi-strong, and a strong form of market 
efficiency, dependent on the market’s level of information accessibility and spread. In 
that sense, the possibility of abnormal returns may be misleadingly interpreted as a 
violation of the efficient market hypothesis: However, since election periods are greatly 
defined by uncertainty, which is reflected in possibly huge price movements. 
‘Abnormal’ returns that might be observed after the release of election related news, 
such as opinion polls, are rather a confirmation of the EMH’s concept of prices (and 
price-movements) reflecting the overall market sentiment, as fostered by the available 
information. The velocity of the market’s intake of the news then defines the level of 
market efficiency4.  
 Also related to the subject of political and financial interaction, Goldman, 
Rocholl and So (2009), show political connection, as in companies with politically 
linked boards have a compelling impact on the value of these companies5.  
 Medeiros & Roriz (2014) have been looking into the equity risk premium by 
means of the 2004 US Presidential Election: They found that stocks which are highly 
exposed to the market tend to suffer in periods of political uncertainty and that equity 
prices possibly reflect uncertainty linked to elections.  
 Moreover, Bialkowski, Gottschalk and Wisniewski (2008) have been looking at 
stock market volatility during periods of elections, studying 27 countries: They found 
                                                
4 Additionally, it should be mentioned that defining the actual level of Market Efficiency in the real world 
is not an easy task, since markets are opaque entities. Nevertheless, there is overall agreement that 
emerging markets such as the Brazilian market are rather defined by a week or semi-strong form of 
efficiency. 
5 Goldman, Rocholl and So’s 2009 study focuses on firms within the US. 
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that stock market volatility is indeed substantially increased during periods of national 
elections. Using a volatility event study within the framework of a GARCH (1,1) 
volatility model, they examined 134 elections, and found that “a strong abnormal rise 
starts on Election Day” (Bialkowski et al, 2008: 1947), whereas the market starts to 
settle down “after around 15 trading days following the event” (ibid). Additionally, the 
research drew on the determinants of excess volatility, the authors found, the margin of 
victory, as in the closeness of the opponents, to be a significant determining factor. 
Further, “a change in political orientation of the executive also adds to volatility of 
stock prices” (ibid)6. Drawing upon the compensation of investors taking political risk 
while holding stock during election periods, they did not find positive abnormal returns: 
“down and upwards moves occur with almost equal probability” (Bialkowski et al, 
2008: 1949).  
 Bringing the gathered information together leads to somewhat confusing results: 
on a macro level, financial election cycles with market uplifts around election periods 
occur (Allvine and O’Neill (1980); Johnson et al. (1999); Panzalis et al. (2000)); 
however, on a micro level, when looking specifically into small event windows around 
election day Bialkowski, Gottschalk and Wisniewski (2008) did not find potential for 
positive abnormal returns on an international level.  
 Building upon the knowledge studies such as Bialkowski, Gottschalk and 
Wisniewski’s provided, this study researches the possible impact of the 2014 Brazilian 
Presidential Elections on overall market behaviour, in depth. Due to the vigorous 
empirical nature of the research, the data has been analysed by utilising the widely used 
concept of abnormal returns in an event study context. The following section is 
                                                
6 Further significant determinants: minority governments and short history of trading (age of stock 
exchange), (see Bialkowski, Gottschalk & Wisniewski, 2008). 
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2.2 Analytical Framework: Event Studies 
Event studies have been widely used within financial research, to investigate investors’ 
responses to specific events. Mostly, Event study methodology is used to examine the 
impact of firm specific events such as the issuance of new debt or the announcements of 
earnings. However, it has also been utilised to investigate the impact of events 
concerning overall economic condition7. During periods of events new information is 
processed by the markets which conceivably leads to abnormal returns, (see Liu, 2007). 
 MacKinlay (1997) suggests key steps to follow, to successfully conduct an event 
study: First, the Event has to be defined: 
 
 
Figure 2: Timeline of an Event Study (see MacKinlay, 1997: 20) 
 
Here, the estimation window is the basis of the calculation of a series’ expected values. 
The event window is the actual period of concern where the possibly abnormal returns 
may have occurred. The post-event window is considered when it is of interested what 
happened to the prices after the actual event8. 
 
                                                
7 For instance, change in legislation or the impact of elections.   
8 Mostly, from a longer term perspective. 
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Next, the expected or normal values (i.e. returns) of a series are calculated based on 
data from the estimation window. Here, differing approaches are available, dependent 
on which type of series is under observation. The most common approach to estimate a 
series of expected returns is based on the Market Model: Which is an ordinary least 
square approach of regressing a series of expected returns, by means of an intercept 
estimation (𝛼!) ; a market-based beta estimate (𝛽!) , which describes the firm’s 
relationship to overall market-movements; the actual returns of the market (𝑅!,!); as 
well as an error term (𝜀!,!)9. 
𝐸(𝑅!,!) =   𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑅!,! + 𝜀!,! , 𝜀!,!  ~  𝑁(0,𝜎!,!) 
 
After defining the expected returns for a specific period, the abnormal returns have to be 
calculated: Following logical reasoning, abnormal returns within a certain period can be 
defined as the difference between actual (observed) returns minus the expected returns 
(Serra, 2002)10. 
𝐴𝑅!,! = 𝑅!,! − 𝐸(𝑅!,!) 
 
Further, the measure of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) provides the cumulative 
sum of observed abnormal returns over the event period. The fact that during the period 
under consideration in this study, right before the election, polls have been release on an 
almost daily basis, which makes it difficult to calculate CARs. Most of the event 
periods in use have a length of only one day, to avoid interference of differing events 
                                                
9 This can be classified as a regression based approach according to Cable and Holland’s study in 1999. 
10 By definition, this is equal to the residual in the specific time period – the difference between the actual 
and the fitted value. 
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with one-another11. The average abnormal return (AvAR) provides the mean amount of 
all the abnormal returns within the event period12. 
 The next step is defining whether the observed abnormal returns as well as their 
cumulative sum are sufficiently abnormal to be statistically significant. This can be 
observed via hypothesis testing of the abnormal returns: The null hypothesis of no 
abnormal returns (AR=0) can be tested against various alternatives of either negative 
abnormal returns (AR<0), positive abnormal returns (AR>0), or abnormal returns that 
are different from zero (AR≠0), depending on expectations about the possible impact of 
the event. Then, a test statistic is computed which has to be compared to a critical 
value13. The test statistic is computed as follows, whereas SE is the standarderror  










𝑛! − 𝑛! + 1 ∗ 𝑆𝐸!
 
 
Since this study attempts to not only investigate abnormal returns but also abnormal 
volatility and abnormal volume, further modelling assumptions have to be clarified. 
 
                                                
11 However, the study computes a five-day CAR after the final Election, when no further interference due 
to other poll releases can be happening. 
12 Within this study, the AvAR is the average of all day-one abnormal returns among the different events 
of poll releases or actual election rounds, this will be further described in the following section.  
13 For reasons of simplicity, normality is assumed, (see Appendix 3 for the kurtosis, and skewness results 
of the data set).  
14 Since the null hypothesis can be defined as AR of zero the numerator of the AR minus its expectation 
under the null hypothesis (zero), can be simply stated as AR: In stead of:  𝑡!" = !"!!!
!"#(!"!)
 , (the same 
holds for 𝑡!"#). 
 
 14 
In regard to modelling volatility this paper takes a GARCH(1,1) approach:  
 
𝐸(𝑅!,!) =   𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑅!,! + 𝜀!,! , 𝜀!,!  ~  𝑁(0,𝜎!,!) 
𝜎!,! = 𝜔 + 𝛾!𝜀!,!!!! + 𝛾!𝜎!,!!! 
 
𝜎!,! can be described as the conditional volatility, at time t. The GARCH(1,1) process is 
a weighted function of a long term average value (dependent on 𝜔 ), volatility 
information on the previous day (𝛾!𝜀!,!!!! ) and the model’s fitted variance from the 
previous day (𝛾!𝜎!,!!!), (see Brooks, 2008, Chapter 8). The unconditional volatility is 
describing the normal volatility and will be discussed in the next section. 
 Moreover, the study models volume by using a mere mean approach, in that 
sense, the estimation period’s mean volume is defined as the expected value of volume. 
 
 
2.3 Application and Data Selection 
2.3.1 Expected Values and Modelling 
This study is concerned with investigating two differing types of data; data on the 
Brazilian stock market index Ibovespa, as well as data on stocks that are related to the 
Brazilian government. Within the data on the index, three differing series are 
considered: first, the Ibovespa’s returns; second the Ibovespa’s volatility; third, 
Ibovespa’s volume. Further, the two governmentally related stocks of Petrobras and 
Vale are analysed, since they are both highly related to the Brazilian government and 
hence, might especially reflect the impact of political news within financial markets. 
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The data is retrieved from www.finance.yahoo.com15. Within this study, the estimation 
window, which is used to model the expected values of normal returns, has the length of 
600 observations starting on October 10, 2011. Since the Ibovespa is an index itself, the 
market model has to be applied using another broader market index that has a relation to 
the index in question: Within this study two models have been used: First, the S&P500 
was used as a market proxy for modelling the Ibovespa’s expected returns as well as for 
Vale’s and Petrobras’ expected returns, since this is a less biased proxy than the 
Ibovespa index itself16. As a second model the study uses the exchange traded fund 
EEM (iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF)17 as a market proxy to model expected 
returns – see Appendix 1 for information on the ETF’s composition. 
 Using OLS regression, expected returns of IBovespa based on the 600 
Observations, stating on October 10, 2011, can be described as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!&!:              𝐸[𝑅^!"#$] =   −0.001+ 0.92𝑅!&!                                            𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅!: 35.2% 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!!":              𝐸[𝑅^!"#$] =   −0.0002+ 0.70𝑅!!"                                   𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅!: 50.3% 
 
Regarding volatility, within the framework of this paper, the conditional volatility 𝜎!,! 
has been used as the ‘actual’ volatility value at time t, whereas the normal/ expected 
volatility value is defined by the unconditional volatility  𝜎. Here, 𝜎 is defined by the 
squared variance of 𝜀!,      !"#$%&#$'(  !"#$%&  using 599 residuals stemming from the 
regressions.  
 
                                                
15 Index data on the IBovespa: ^bvsp; on the S&P500: ^gspc; on Vale: vale; on Petrobras: petr3.sa and 
petr4.sa; on iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF: EEM 
16 The Ibovespa is subject of a great deal of affection by movements of the two stocks, because they make 
up a large part of the index’s composition. 
17 The EEM has been chosen due to its really small exposure to Brazil, as an emerging market itself (only 
6%), whereas China, South Korea and Taiwan constitute the largest share (in sum 51%). 
 16 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!&!:              𝜎^!"#$ = 1.10% 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!!":              𝜎^!"#$ = 0.96% 
 
Furthermore, the GARCH(1,1) parameters for conditional volatility have been estimated 
using a Maximum Likelihood approach18: 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!&!:              𝜎^!"#$,! = 0.00001+ 0.03𝜀^!"#$,!!!! + 0.89𝜎^!"#$,!!! 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!!":              𝜎^!"#$,! = 0.00002+ 0.09𝜀^!"#$,!!!! + 0.73𝜎^!"#!,!!! 
 
In regards to modelling expected volume, academia does not provide a clear-cut way to 
obtain very accurate results. Hence, this research simply models expected volume by 
taking the mean of Ibovespa’s trading volume over the estimation period. First, a 600 
observations model has been used, starting at October, 10, 2011 and ending at April 11, 
2014. In mid 2013 Brazil lived through a period of riots and public unrest, which 
supposedly especially impacted the trading volume, leading to a phase of highly volatile 
volumes. Since this may bias the expected mean value of the index’s volume, 
additionally a 400-obeservaion average model has been applied. 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙  ø!"#,      !""  !"#$%&'()*+#:                        𝐸[𝑉𝑙𝑚!] = 3,796,067 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙  ø!"#,      !""  !"#$%&'()*+#:                        𝐸[𝑉𝑙𝑚!] = 3,416,666 
Following a similar approach than the one of modelling Ibovespa’s expected returns, 
Vale’s returns can be described as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!&!:              𝐸[𝑅!"#$] =   −0.002+ 1.49𝑅!&!                                            𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅!: 36.3% 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!!":              𝐸[𝑅!"#$] =   −0.0009+ 1.16𝑅!!"                                       𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅!: 55.0% 
                                                
18 𝑀𝐿𝐸 = − !
!










When considering the returns of Petrobras the study compares two different types of 
stocks available on Petrobras, the ‘usual’ (Petr3) stock, which comes with all the 
features of regular common stock, as well as the preferred stock (Petr4), which comes 
along with the features of preferred stock, that can very simply be described as 
privileged remuneration, on the costs of no voting rights. Both stocks can respectively 
be described as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!&!:              𝐸(𝑅!"#$!) =   −0.002+ 1.13𝑅!&!                                    𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅!: 18.2% 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!!":              𝐸(𝑅!"#$!) =   −0.001+ 0.86𝑅!!"                                 𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅!: 26.7% 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!&!:              𝐸(𝑅!"#$!) =   −0.0007+ 1.02𝑅!&!                                    𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅!: 16.0% 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!!":              𝐸(𝑅!"#$!) =   −0.0001+ 0.86𝑅!!"                                 𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅!: 28.4% 
 
The next section is concerned with describing the approach towards the actual testing of 
abnormality during the election period via applying event study methodology and 
graphical data analysis. 
 
 
2.3.2 Application of Event Studies 
On the basis of the above-mentioned expected values several event studies were 
conducted, to test whether there was indeed abnormal stock market behaviour related to 
news about the upcoming election. In this regard, eight events have been selected to be 
tested; two of these eight events are the actual election results (round one, October 5, 
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2014; and round two, October 26, 2014)19. Further, the eight events stem from a period 
which is referred to in this study as ‘period of events’, starting on October 03, 2014 and 
ending on October 31, 2014. Hence, all eight events are part of this ‘period of events’ of 
21 observations. 
 Since opinion polls were published quite frequently, and by several institutions, 
a system of event selection has been employed that attempts to ensure that the single 
events are not overly biasing one-another20. Further, the events were categorised into 
two groups dependent on whether the then-incumbent (and now re-elected) President 
Dilma Rousseff (PT)21 was relatively gaining or loosing in share. In that sense, the type 
I events are defined as events when Rousseff was relatively gaining in share. Type II 
Events, are defined as events when Dilma was relatively loosing in share. Both event 
types have four observations each, whereas type II events, can be described as events 
when challenger Aécio Neves (PSDB)22 was relatively gaining in share, apart from the 
first event, which was still prior the first round of election and more challengers were 
still in the race. However, only the first two candidates (Rousseff and Neves) were 
allowed to enter the second round.  
 Table 1 below summarises the events that have been selected for the event study 
tests, whereas Type I events can be observed in red, and Type II Events in blue. The 
bolded dates refer to the actual first and second election round. New results have been 
published very frequently, and since it was a close race, the lead has been reversed quite 
often; therefore, the window length has been set to one day, except for the last event, 
                                                
19 Since, the elections took place on a Sunday the event study as such was conducted on the following 
Monday, when the new information was processed by the markets. 
20 However in reality, it is extremely challenging to concretely measure the impact of the different poll 
events upon each other.  
21 The PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores), ‘Workers’ Party’ is the Brazilian Labour party, which stresses 
labour and social political issues. 
22 The PSDP (Partido da Social Democracia), ‘Social Democracy Party’ has a centrist alignment.   
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where the event window has a length of two to five trading days23; here, CARs can 
properly calculated.  
 The percentage values of the candidates are based on data from 
www.eleicoes2014.com.br/pesquisa-eleitoral-para-presidente, as well as other news 
websites, whereas the mean was taken when more than one poll was published on a 
given day. Appendix 2 provides a detailed list on which date, at which time and by 
whom the polls were released, clarifying how the poll release date has been made fit to 
trading days. When a poll was released during the Bovespa’s opening hours it enters 
into market information on the same day, when the release was after market close, the 
study considers the information to be valid for the next day.   
 Finally, the abnormal values for each event have been computed and their 
significance has been tested. For the last event abnormal values have been computed for 




Table 1: Poll Events (based on Eleições 2014 (2014, a&b); 
see Appendix 2 for a detailed list of poll releases) 
 
                                                
23 Since the last event is already after the final election, there cannot be any interference.  
24 Whereas ‘CAR/ CAVlm’ stands for cumulative abnormal returns, and –volume.  
Trading	  Days	   Market	   Aécio	   Dilma	   ∆	  Dilma	   Info	  Date	   Event	  Type	   #Event	  
Monday,	  	  
27	  October	  14	  
Election	  round	  2	  on	  Sunday	  
–	  market	  closed	   48.35%	   51.65%	   6.25%	  
Info	  from	  
Sunday	   Type	  I	   8	  
Friday,	  	  
24	  October	  14	   Market	  open	   54.60%	   45.40%	   -­‐8.10%	   	  	   Type	  II	   7	  
Thursday,	  	  
23	  October	  14	  
Info	  from	  23th	  after	  market	  
close	  –>	  -­‐1	  day	  
48.00%	   52.00%	   5.20%	   Info	  from	  
Wednesday	  
Type	  I	   6	  
Thursday,	  	  
16	  October	  14	  
Info	  from	  16th	  after	  market	  
close	  –>	  -­‐1	  day	   51.00%	   49.00%	   3.80%	  
Info	  from	  
Wednesday	   Type	  I	   5	  
Monday,	  	  
13	  October	  14	  
Info	  from	  13th	  after	  market	  
close	  –>	  -­‐1	  day	   58.80%	   41.20%	   -­‐6.53%	  
Info	  from	  
Saturday	   Type	  II	   4	  
Friday,	  	  
10	  October	  14	  
No	  new	  Info	  on	  the	  10th	  –>	  
-­‐1	  day	   52.27%	   47.73%	   1.73%	  
Info	  from	  
Thursday	   Type	  I	   3	  
Monday,	  	  
6	  October	  14	  
Election	  round	  1	  on	  Sunday	  
–	  market	  closed	   33.53%	   41.61%	   -­‐4.06%	  
Info	  from	  
Sunday	   Type	  II	   2	  
Friday,	  	  
3	  October	  14	  
Market	  still	  open	  but	  late:	  
Release	  16:51	   20.60%	   37.30%	   -­‐8.20%	   	  	   Type	  II	   1	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3 Analysis 
During the election period graphs plotting the results of opinion polls, such as the ones 
below, were everywhere. Politicians, newspapers, as well as to a certain deal academia 
and many other actors were battling via headlines over headlines. The Brazilian election 
was receiving a great deal of media attention, not just in Brazil itself but also in the rest 
of the world. One could argue that the huge level of international media attention was 
mainly due to the fact that the election results might have an effect on Brazil’s market 
conditions, which is arguably of great interest to many international investors, who view 
it as a promising emerging market; this would be inline with the Wall Street Journal’s 
newspaper article, cited in the introduction25.  
 When looking at Figure 3 it becomes obvious that this electoral race was an 
extremely close head-to-head race, with many game changing events and an unusual 
frequency of changes in the lead. 
 
 
Figure 3: Opinion poll and first and second election round results (based on Eleições 2014. (2014,a&b)) 
                                                
25 Jelmayer & Magalhaes, 2014 
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This vacillation of the Brazilian voters (see Figure 3), led to great percussions within the 
Brazilian markets. However, it has to be academically clarified in how far this period of 
volatile market behaviour has been significantly related to the publication of election 
news. The following sections are devoted to researching this relationship. 
 
 
3.1 Market Returns 
Figure 4 below, shows that the fitted vales of both models fit the actual values quite 
well within the first twenty observations of the estimation window, see right panels of 
Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4: Actual and fitted values: first 20 observation of Estimation Window; Period of Events26 
                                                
26 It might be confusing that only 16 events are shown on the axis, this is however only due to reasons of 























































































































































































































































































































































































































When the period of events is considered, the fitted values do not fit the actual values of 
the Ibovespa at all, suggesting that there are in deed abnormal returns. When analysing 
the abnormality of returns for type I events, all four events have negative returns, and 
two of the four events show show significant abnormal returns. On average it has been 
confirmed, that the returns of the four events within the category of ‘Dilma gaining in 
share’, have been significantly abnormal. More precisely, for both models, the null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal returns can be rejected with a 99% level of significance 
(see Table 2)27. 
     S&P Model    EEM Model    
Date R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig 1% 
Sig 





10/10 -3.48% -55.2% - -2.34% -37.2% -2.13 no yes -1.92% -30.5% -1.99 no yes 
16/10 -3.33% -52.8% - -3.26% -51.8% -2.97 yes yes -2.67% -42.3% -2.77 yes yes 
23/10 -3.29% -52.3% - -4.34% -68.9% -3.95 yes yes -3.25% -51.7% -3.38 yes yes 
27/10 -2.81% -44.5% - -2.59% -41.1% -2.36 no yes -2.24% -35.5% -2.32 no yes 
Ø  -3.23% -51.2%   -3.13% -49.8% -2.85 yes yes -2.52% -40.0% -2.62 yes yes 
	  
Table 2: Abnormal Returns Ibovespa – Type I Events 
 
For the last event, the final election round CARs have been calculated, see Table 3 and 
4. However, none of those CARs from either model, (although having different length: 
from 2 days to 5 days, see second column of Table 3 and 4 for the length), can be seen 
as significantly abnormal.  
	    
S&P Model 
     
Date CAR AR d AR y CAR d CAR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 
5% 
31/10 5d +3.3% +52.2% 2.96% 47.0% 1.20 no no 
30/10 4d +2.0% +31.7% -0.33% -5.3% -0.15 no no 
29/10 3d -2.3% -36.1% -2.33% -37.0% -1.22 no no 
28/10 2d +2.5% +40.3% -0.05% -0.9% -0.03 no no 
27/10 1d -2.6% -41.1% -2.59% -41.1% -2.36 no yes 
 
Table 3: CARs  Ibovespa Type I Events S&P Model 
                                                
27 Within Table 2 and the following tables, R d shows the daily ln-returns (logarithmic returns), whereas 
R y depicts the annualised version, same holds for AR (abnormal returns), and CAR (cumulative 
abnormal returns).  
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EEM Model 
     
Date CAR AR d AR y CAR d CAR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 
5% 
31/10 5d +4.0% +63.6% 3.26% 51.7% 1.51 no no 
30/10 4d +1.9% +29.6% -0.75% -12.0% -0.39 no no 
29/10 3d -2.6% -40.6% -2.61% -41.5% -1.57 no no 
28/10 2d +2.2% +34.6% -0.06% -0.9% -0.04 no no 
27/10 1d -2.2% -35.5% -2.24% -35.5% -2.32 no yes 
 
Table 4: CARs Ibovespa Type I Events EEM Model 
 
Due to the change of sign over consecutive trading days, the cumulative sum 
approaches zero at the 2-day CAR and the 4-day CAR. (Appendix 5 graphically shows 
the post election CARs for Ibovespa’s returns).  
 When looking at type II events, when Dilma is relatively loosing in share, all 
events show positive returns. There are significant abnormal returns to be found, more 
precisely, for two of four events, as well as for the average of all four events, the null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal returns can be rejected at a significance level of 99%, see 
Table 5 for details. 
 
     S&P Model    EEM Model    
 Date  R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 





03/10 1.89% 30.0% + +0.95% +15.0% 0.86 no no +1.32% +20.9% 1.37 no no 
06/10 4.61% 73.3% + +4.84% +76.8% 4.40 yes yes +3.73% +59.2% 3.87 yes yes 
13/10 4.67% 74.2% + +6.27% +99.6% 5.71 yes yes +3.99% +63.3% 4.14 yes yes 
24/10 2.39% 38.0% + +1.82% +28.9% 1.66 no no +1.92% +30.5% 1.99 no yes 
Ø  3.39% 53.8%   +3.47% +55.1% 3.16 yes yes +2.74% +43.5% 2.84 yes yes 
 
Table 5: Abnormal Returns Ibovespa – Type II Events 
 
3.2 Volatility 
For analysing Ibovespa’s volatility a slightly different, graphical approach has been 
applied, since the assumptions regarding volatility during the election period are 
different from the assumptions regarding returns. First, when looking at volatility this 
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study is looking at the entire period of events, rather than single Type I and Type II 
events, to research whether volatility is increased over the election period as a whole. 
Within the last section it became obvious that during the election period returns have 
been switching signs very frequently, almost on a daily basis, which already implies 
that there should be increased volatility, when seen as the second moment of return. 
Due to an election period being subject to general market uncertainty, it is assumed that 
independent of which candidate takes the lead, at any point in time during the election 
period, volatility is probably increased. Ibovespa’s volatility has been proxied by the 
above described GARCH(1,1) model using the S&P regression’s residuals as well as 
the EEM regression’s residuals, see Figures 5 & 6.  
 
 
Figure 5: GARCH(1,1) S&P Model annualised Volatility: Estimation Period - Period of Events  
 25 
 
Figure 6: GARCH(1,1) EEM Model annualised Volatility: Estimation Period - Period of Events  
 
Both models show, that when the election period is approaching, volatility is clearly 
rising. Even when considering a band of ±2 standard deviations, during the period of 
events, volatility is clearly rising far above the natural level of volatility.  
 
 
Figure 7: GARCH(1,1) S&P Model annualised Volatility – Period of Events  
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Figure 8: GARCH(1,1) EEM Model annualised Volatility – Period of Events  
 
Figure 7 and 8 display the two models’ precise evolvement of volatility during the 
period of events. Both models show, that after October 7, Ibovespa’s volatility proxy 
exceeds its natural level, by far, leading to a maximum annualised volatility level of 
29.13% (1.84% in daily terms) within the period of events, considering data from the 
EEM Model28.  
 When conducting an event study, the graphical results can be approved. For the 
first two events an abnormal volatility of zero cannot be rejected, however for the other 
six events an abnormal volatility of zero can be rejected at a 99% significance level, see 
Appendix 4 for details. 
 It can be concluded that volatility reaches extremely high levels during the 
period of events, but slowly comes back to a normal level over time (see Figures 9 & 
                                                
28 Maximum annualised volatility S&P Model: 30.89% (1.95% in daily terms)  
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10, which show volatility in 2014 and 2015). The S&P model and the EEM model show 
reversion, whereas within the EEM model, the unconditional volatility level is reached 
faster (after 10 trading days, precisely). Within the S&P Model approximately two 
month passed until abnormal volatility of zero cannot be rejected any more. 
 
Figure 9: GARCH(1,1) S&P Model: 2014 - 2015 
 
 
Figure 10: GARCH(1,1) EEM Model: 2014 - 2015 
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3.3 Volume 
As already described in the modelling section, it is difficult to accurately model and 
forecast trading volume, therefore, a mean approach has been applied within this study. 
Hence, the normal level of volume, based on the mean of a 600-observation-long 
estimation window, is set to be approximately 3,800,000. Whereas the normal level, 
based on an estimation window length of 400 observations, is set to be approximately 
3,400,000, (see Section 2.3.1 for the exact values).  
 Figure 11 and 12 below summarise the period of events, of the two models. It 
becomes clear that trading volume in general has rather risen than decreased, since for 
both models the period of event average lies slightly above the estimation window 
averages.  
 Generally, the 600-observation estimation window average is higher than the 
400-observation average, due to times of very high volume levels, as well as variation 
in volume in the second half of 2013. Therefore, it follows, that the slightly increased 
level of volume during the election period, can be considered to be more abnormal 
when looking at the 400-obsevation average, with a lower natural level of volume. 
 
 
Figure 11: Volume Ibovespa (ø 600 Obs.) – Period of Events 
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Figure 12: Volume Ibovespa (ø 400 Obs.) – Period of Events 
 
Based on the statistical tests below (see Table 6 and 7), it becomes obvious that, on 




Table 6: Abnormal Volume Ibovespa – Type I Events 
 
  ø 600 Obs.    ø 400 Obs.   
	   Date  Vlm d AVlm d t-stat Sig. 1% Sig. 5% AVlm d t-stat Sig. 1% Sig. 5% 
03/10 3,708,600 -87,467 -0.06 no no 291,934 0.27 no no 
06/10 6,714,000 2,917,933 1.95 no no 3,297,334 3.05 yes yes 
13/10 4,544,400 748,333 0.50 no no 1,127,734 1.04 no no 
24/10 5,852,100 2,056,033 1.37 no no 2,435,434 2.25 no yes 
øAVlm 5,204,775 1,408,708 0.94 no no 1,788,109 1.65 no no 
 
Table 7: Abnormal Volume Ibovespa – Type II Events 
 
However, when looking at the CAVlms after the final election day, the cumulative sum 
of the volume becomes significant for the 600-observation model for CAVlm(1,1) until 
  ø 600 Obs.    ø 400 Obs.   
	  Date Vlm d AVlm d t-stat Sig. 1% Sig. 5% AVlm d t-stat Sig. 1% Sig. 5% 
10/10 3,635,700 -160,367 -0.11 no no 219,034 0.20 no no 
16/10 5,427,800 1,631,733 1.09 no no 2,011,134 1.86 no no 
23/10 6,346,100 2,550,033 1.70 no no 2,929,434 2.71 yes yes 
27/10 7,999,300 4,203,233 2.81 yes yes 4,582,634 4.23 yes yes 
øAVlm 5,852,225 2,056,158 1.37 no no 2,435,559 2.25 no yes 
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CAVlm(1,5), and stops being significantly different from zero after the 5th day. For the 
400-observation model, the cumulative sum stays significantly abnormal until 
CAVlm(1,12); from the 13th day onwards, an hypothesis of zero abnormal returns of the 
cumulative sum cannot be rejected anymore. Figure 13 plots the 5-day CAVlm in its 
upper panel, which shows a clear upward trend; the 15-day CAVlm in the lower panel, 
shows that the 600-Observation Model starts to revert its cumulative sum after the 5th 
day; see Appendix 9 for details on the CAVlms. 
 
 






3.4 Governmentally Related Stocks 
3.4.1 Petrobras 
The same abnormal return event study methodology that has been applied on the 
Ibovespa, has also been deployed on Pertrobras’ common stock (Petr3.sa) as well as on 
its preferred version (Petr4.sa). The results are very much in line with the previous 
findings and even more extreme: Type I events for both stocks exhibit only negative 
returns. For three out of four single type I events abnormal returns of zero can be 
rejected on a 99% confidence level as well as their average, for both models.  
 Similarly, all type II events show positive returns, with a significant abnormal 
average (see Appendix 6 for details on Petr3.sa and Petr4.sa’s performance). Hence, it 
can be concluded that Petrobras does react strongly on political news, more precisely, 




Since, neither type I nor type II events yield any significant results on average, when 
conducting and analysing the event studies of Vale’s abnormal returns, it can be 
concluded that Vale’s stock did not lead to any abnormal returns during the election 
period. This suggests that it is not as dependent or related to governmental/ and political 




                                                
29 Vale, listed on the NYSE, as well as Vale5.sa, listed on the Bovespa. Both have been considered, 
however, neither yielded any significant results.  
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4 Robustness, Further Research and Concluding Remarks 
The above stated research question of whether there has been abnormal stock market 
behaviour as a consequence of election news regarding the last Brazilian presidential 
election, has been confirmatively answered. The study found that there have been 
abnormal returns; that volatility has been significantly increased during the election 
period, which is in line with Bialkowski et al.’s findings (2008); and that volume was 
slightly elevated during the election period.  
 The Brazilian stock index Ibovespa as well as the governmentally related 
company Petrobras reacted with negative abnormal returns to poll releases in favour of 
Rousseff. When Rousseff was relatively loosing in share, there have been positive 
abnormal returns on the day of the release itself, or on the subsequent trading day, when 
the poll results have been released after market close.  
 In order to preclude that these abnormal values are subject to an overall South 
American trend, the same event study methodology was conducted on Argentina’s stock 
index MERVAL: As one might have expected, the results were not significant30 (see 
Appendix 8 for statistical data).  
 
In order to additionally validate the study, further research on the subject may be 
conducted: Option strategies are one way of dealing with (electoral-) uncertainty. I.e. a 
straddle31, which basically bets on market movement, would be a wise strategy when 
considering that this research, as well as Bialkowski et al., conclude that there is an 
                                                
30 On average, type I and type II events have not yielded any significant results, whereas none of the 
single type I events have been significantly abnormal. However, within the type II events, two single 
events show abnormality, whereas one of them shows a significant negative abnormal return and the 
second one a significant positive abnormal return. Due to differentiation in signs, other causes of 
abnormality are assumed.  
31 The combination of a put and a call option with the same strike price and expiration date  
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overall increased level of volatility during election phases. Hence, one could look at the 
evolvement of option prices and underlying option strategies to further conclude about 
the market participants’ expectations in relation to elections.  
 Moreover, improvements could be made especially in regard to more accurately 
modelling volume. Additional governmentally related stocks, such as utilities, may also 
be considered to strengthen the results. Furthermore, it would be interesting to research 
whether there has been any abnormal behaviour in relation to foreign investment within 
Brazil during the election period and consequently in a post event window.  
 Another interesting evolvement can be observed when looking at the number of 
IPOs launched in Brazil: As Levin (2015) puts it, “these days, Brazilian companies are 
more likely to de-list than go public as … a crippling recession and political turmoil 
wipe out $290 billion in market vale this year alone”. In fact, the number of companies 
going public within Brazil has heavily decreased over the last two years (see Figure 14 
below), a development, that may also suggest, that the political environment does not 
inspire companies to go public. Within a framework of further research it would be 
interesting to study the relationship of political environment and election phases and 
IPOs. 
 
Figure 14: IPO’s in Brazil, based on Elliott, 2015 and EY, 2013 
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All in all this study concludes that in this particular setting abnormal returns (positive as 
well as negative) have been possible – in this setting depending on who takes the lead. 
This could also be researched in an international cross-sectional setting, using for 
instance, Bialkowski et al.’s determinant of closeness of the electoral race. Hence, 
looking into elections considered to be close, and whether they reveal opposite direction 
of abnormal returns, more precisely, one candidate’s lead in polls is answered with 
positive abnormal returns while another is connected to negative abnormal returns. 
 To finally conclude, this study is the mere beginning of what still needs to be 
researched elaborately, to approach full comprehension of the interaction between 
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Appendix 2 – Additional Data on Poll Releases 
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Appendix 3 – Descriptive Statistics on the Data Sets 
 
 44 
Appendix 4 – Volatility Event study 
 
S&P Model  
	  
    EEM Model  
	  
    









03/10 1.25% 19.9% +0.15% +2.5% 2.18 no yes 1.13% 17.9% +0.16% +2.6% 1.53 no no 
06/10 1.23% 19.6% +0.13% +2.1% 1.89 no no 1.12% 17.8% +0.16% +2.5% 1.46 no no 
13/10 1.50% 23.8% +0.40% +6.4% 5.67 yes yes 1.34% 21.2% +0.37% +5.9% 3.49 yes yes 
10/10 1.49% 23.7% +0.39% +6.2% 5.54 yes yes 1.32% 21.0% +0.36% +5.7% 3.38 yes yes 
16/10 1.75% 27.8% +0.65% +10.3% 9.15 yes yes 1.54% 24.4% +0.58% +9.2% 5.39 yes yes 
24/10 1.95% 30.9% +0.85% +13.5% 11.94 yes yes 1.62% 25.7% +0.66% +10.5% 6.16 yes yes 
23/10 1.86% 29.5% +0.76% +12.1% 10.72 yes yes 1.75% 27.7% +0.78% +12.4% 7.33 yes yes 
27/10 1.89% 30.0% +0.79% +12.6% 11.18 yes yes 1.65% 26.3% +0.69% +11.0% 6.46 yes yes 
Ø 1.62% 25.6% +0.52% +8.2% 7.28 yes yes 1.43% 22.8% +0.47% +7.5% 4.40 yes yes 
 




Appendix Graph 1: Post-Election (15 trading days) CAV Ibovespa – after day 10 (November 11, 2014) 






Appendix 5 – Plots of Ibovespa’s post election CAR 
 
 

















Appendix 6 – Event study: Petrobras  
     
S&P 
Model     
EEM 
Model     
Date R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 





10/10 -5.99% -95.0% - -4.52% -71.7% -2.16 no yes -3.99% -63.4% -2.02 no yes 
16/10 -7.53% -119.6% - -7.38% -117.1% -3.53 yes yes -6.64% -105.5% -3.36 yes yes 
23/10 -6.43% -102.1% - -7.64% -121.3% -3.66 yes yes -6.31% -100.2% -3.20 yes yes 
27/10 -10.96% -174.0% - -10.62% -168.6% -5.09 yes yes -10.19% -161.7% -5.15 yes yes 
øAR -7.73% -122.7%   -7.54% -119.7% -3.61 yes yes -6.78% -107.7% -3.43 yes yes 
 
Appendix Table 2: Abnormal Returns Petr3.sa – Type I Events 
 
     
S&P 
Model     
EEM 
Model     
 Date  R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 





03/10 5.34% 84.8% + +4.26% +67.6% 2.04 no yes +4.70% +74.6% 2.38 no yes 
06/10 9.27% 147.2% + +9.62% +152.7% 4.61 yes yes +8.24% +130.9% 4.17 yes yes 
13/10 9.87% 156.7% + +11.91% +189.1% 5.70 yes yes +9.10% +144.4% 4.60 yes yes 
24/10 4.23% 67.1% + +3.61% +57.2% 1.73 no no +3.71% +58.9% 1.88 no no 
øAR 7.18% 113.9%   +7.35% +116.6% 3.52 yes yes +6.44% +102.2% 3.26 yes yes 
 
Appendix Table 3: Abnormal Returns Petr3.sa – Type II Events 
 
     
S&P 
Model     
EEM 
Model     
Date R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 





10/10 -5.58% -88.5% - -4.33% -68.8% -2.07 no yes -3.67% -58.2% -1.90 no no 
16/10 -7.74% -122.8% - -7.68% -122.0% -3.68 yes yes -6.93% -110.1% -3.59 yes yes 
23/10 -7.50% -119.0% - -8.68% -137.8% -4.15 yes yes -7.47% -118.5% -3.87 yes yes 
27/10 -11.56% -183.6% - -11.34% -180.1% -5.43 yes yes -10.88% -172.6% -5.64 yes yes 
øAR -8.09% -128.5%   -8.01% -127.1% -3.83 yes yes -7.24% -114.9% -3.75 yes yes 
 
Appendix Table 4: Abnormal Returns Petr4.sa – Type I Events 
 
     
S&P 
Model     
EEM 
Model     
Date R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 





03/10 5.89% 93.5% + +4.83% +76.6% 2.31 no yes +5.17% +82.0% 2.68 yes yes 
06/10 10.54% 167.3% + +10.77% +171.0% 5.15 yes yes +9.43% +149.7% 4.89 yes yes 
13/10 9.87% 156.7% + +11.64% +184.7% 5.57 yes yes +9.01% +143.1% 4.67 yes yes 
24/10 5.61% 89.1% + +4.96% +78.8% 2.38 no yes +5.01% +79.6% 2.60 yes yes 
øAR 7.98% 126.7%   +8.05% +127.8% 3.85 yes yes +7.16% +113.6% 3.71 yes yes 
 
Appendix Table 5: Abnormal Returns Petr4.sa – Type II Events 
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Appendix 7 – Event Study: Vale 
 
     
S&P 
Model     
EEM 
Model     
Date R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 





10/10 -3.16% -50.2% - -1.26% -20.0% -0.73 no no -0.52% -8.3% -0.36 no no 
16/10 -3.70% -58.7% - -3.54% -56.2% -2.06 no yes -2.55% -40.5% -1.76 no no 
23/10 0.09% 1.5% + -1.55% -24.6% -0.90 no no +0.21% +3.3% 0.14 no no 
27/10 -5.34% -84.7% - -4.93% -78.3% -2.86 yes yes -4.34% -68.9% -3.00 yes yes 
øAR -3.03% -48.0%   -2.82% -44.8% -1.64 no no -1.80% -28.6% -1.25 no no 
 
Appendix Table 6: Abnormal Returns Vale – Type I Events 
 
     
S&P 
Model     
EEM 
Model     
 Date  R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 





03/10 -0.63% -10.1% - -2.11% -33.5% -1.23 no no -1.54% -24.4% -1.06 no no 
06/10 2.60% 41.2% + +3.01% +47.8% 1.75 no no +1.17% +18.6% 0.81 no no 
13/10 5.10% 80.9% + +7.76% +123.1% 4.51 yes yes +4.01% +63.7% 2.77 yes yes 
24/10 3.00% 47.6% + +2.13% +33.9% 1.24 no no +2.26% +35.9% 1.56 no no 
øAR 2.52% 39.9%   +2.70% +42.8% 1.57 no no +1.48% +23.5% 1.02 no no 
 
Appendix Table 7: Abnormal Returns Vale – Type II Events 
 
     
S&P 
Model     
EEM 
Model     









10/10 -1.80% -28.6% - -0.99% -15.7% -0.40 no no -0.53% -8.4% -0.22 no no 
16/10 -2.93% -46.4% - -2.92% -46.4% -1.16 no no -2.41% -38.3% -0.99 no no 
23/10 1.88% 29.8% + +1.05% +16.7% 0.42 no no +1.87% +29.7% 0.77 no no 
27/10 -4.09% -64.9% - -3.97% -63.0% -1.58 no no -3.65% -58.0% -1.49 no no 
øAR -1.73% -27.5%   -1.71% -27.1% -0.68 no no -1.18% -18.7% -0.48 no no 
 
Appendix Table 8: Abnormal Returns Vale5.sa – Type I Events 
 
     
S&P 
Model     
EEM 
Model     
Date R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 





03/10 -1.70% -27.0% - -2.46% -39.0% -0.98 no no -2.23% -35.4% -0.91 no no 
06/10 -0.13% -2.0% - -0.00% -0.1% 0.00 no no -0.92% -14.6% -0.38 no no 
13/10 4.24% 67.3% + +5.40% +85.7% 2.15 no yes +3.62% +57.4% 1.48 no no 
24/10 0.38% 6.0% + -0.09% -1.4% -0.04 no no -0.06% -1.0% -0.03 no no 
øAR 0.70% 11.1%   +0.71% +11.3% 0.28 no no +0.10% +1.6% 0.04 no no 
 
Appendix Table 9: Abnormal Returns Vale5.sa – Type II Events 
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Appendix 8 – Event Study Abnormal Returns: Merval (Placebo Study) 
     
S&P 
Model     
EEM 
Model     
Date R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 





10/10 -1.62% -25.7% - -0.66% -10.5% -0.40 no no -0.35% -5.6% -0.22 no no 
16/10 3.32% 52.7% + +3.20% +50.8% 1.95 no no +3.75% +59.6% 2.35 no yes 
23/10 -2.69% -42.7% - -3.92% -62.2% -2.38 no yes -2.83% -45.0% -1.77 no no 
27/10 -2.50% -39.6% - -2.46% -39.1% -1.50 no no -2.15% -34.1% -1.34 no no 
øAR -0.87% -13.8%   -0.96% -15.2% -0.58 no no -0.39% -6.3% -0.25 no no 
 
Appendix Table 10: Abnormal Returns Merval – Type I Events 
 
     
S&P 
Model     
EEM 
Model     
Date R d R y Sign AR d AR y t-stat Sig. 1% 
Sig. 





03/10 6.48% 102.8% + +5.36% +85.0% 3.26 yes yes +5.77% +91.6% 3.61 yes yes 
06/10 -4.42% -70.2% - -4.38% -69.5% -2.67 yes yes -5.42% -86.0% -3.39 yes yes 
13/10 0.00% 0.0% + -0.19% -3.0% -0.11 no no -0.16% -2.5% -0.10 no no 
24/10 2.76% 43.9% + +2.02% +32.0% 1.23 no no +2.15% +34.1% 1.34 no no 
øAR 1.20% 19.1%   +0.70% +11.1% 0.43 no no +0.58% +9.3% 0.37 no no 
 
Appendix Table 11: Abnormal Returns Merval – Type II Events 
 
 
Appendix 9 – CAVlm Event Study 
	   	  
ø 600 Obs. 
	   	   	   	  
ø 400 Obs. 
	   	   	   	  Date CAVlm Avlm d CAVlm d t-stat Sig. 1% Sig. 5% Avlm d CAVlm d t-stat Sig. 1% Sig. 5% 
14/11 15d -6,767 4,437,497 0.77 no no 372,634 10,128,510 2.42 no yes 
13/11 14d -763,167 4,444,264 0.79 no no -383,766 9,755,876 2.41 no yes 
12/11 13d -597,467 5,207,431 0.97 no no -218,066 10,139,642 2.60 yes yes 
11/11 12d -1,117,567 5,804,898 1.12 no no -738,166 10,357,708 2.76 yes yes 
10/11 11d -822,367 6,922,465 1.40 no no -442,966 11,095,874 3.09 yes yes 
07/11 10d -203,467 7,744,832 1.64 no no 175,934 11,538,840 3.37 yes yes 
06/11 9d -103,567 7,948,298 1.77 no no 275,834 11,362,906 3.50 yes yes 
05/11 8d -894,467 8,051,865 1.90 no no -515,066 11,087,072 3.62 yes yes 
04/11 7d -266,267 8,946,332 2.26 no yes 113,134 11,602,138 4.05 yes yes 
03/11 6d -130,867 9,212,599 2.51 no yes 248,534 11,489,004 4.33 yes yes 
31/10 5d 1,552,133 9,343,466 2.79 yes yes 1,931,534 11,240,470 4.64 yes yes 
30/10 4d 503,633 7,791,333 2.60 yes yes 883,034 9,308,936 4.30 yes yes 
29/10 3d 1,119,233 7,287,700 2.81 yes yes 1,498,634 8,425,902 4.49 yes yes 
28/10 2d 1,965,233 6,168,466 2.92 yes yes 2,344,634 6,927,268 4.53 yes yes 
27/10 1d 4,203,233 4,203,233 2.81 yes yes 4,582,634 4,582,634 4.23 yes yes 
 
Appendix Table 12: Cumulative Abnormal Volume Ibovespa 
